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THE PARADOX OF TRANSLATION 
Roger Wertheimer 
Agnes Scott College, Decatur, U.S.A. 
Abstract: Alonzo Church claimed that (1) 'Red' means red is properly translated by (2) 
'Red' heisst rot, and not by (3) 'Rot' heisst rot, because (1) and (2) predicate the same 
property (meaning red) of the same object, the English word 'red', whereas (3) predicates 
that property of the German word 'rot'. Since (2) is plainly a contingent empirical truth 
knowable only a posteriori, (1) must be the same, and so too for (3). More generally, 
apparent semantic principles like (M) 'K' means K, (C) 'K' means L ≡ 'L' means K, or (T) 
'p' is true ≡ p can be only empirical generalizations about the English language. That 
conclusion seems absurd while Church's reasoning seems compelling. Church goes wrong 
by misconceiving the grammar of displays - what the Fregean tradition miscalls quotations 
(because quotation marks mark displays). Displays are perceptual objects linguistically ap-
propriated by incorporation in a syntactic structure as adjuncts of a displasionable term, a 
term whose extension is identifiable by presenting (e.g. by ostension) an object incorpor-
able in an utterance. Another misconception concerns the role of symbol recurrence in the 
truth-securing syntax of formal truths and the significance of nonuniform substitution of 
synonyms in formal truths. 
 
 
1. Church's Paradox 
A half century ago the distinguished mathematical logician, Alonzo Church, promoted the thesis that 
translations can be tests of certain alleged necessary truths1. What is called the Church translation 
test might better be called the Paradox of Translation, like the related Paradox of Analysis. On the 
one hand, it seems axiomatic that to be informationally equivalent a translation must at least retain 
the truth conditions and thus the truth or falsity of the original, so if an informationally equivalent 
translation states a contingent, empirical truth or falsehood, then the original cannot be a necessary 
truth. Yet, paradoxically, this principle seems to conflict with other equally undeniable principles, 
like: 
 
(M) 'K' means K 
(1) 'Red' means red 
(C) 'K' means L ≡ 'L' means K2 
(1c) 'Azure' means cobalt ≡ 'cobalt' means azure 
(T) 'p' is true ≡ p 
(2) 'Blood is red' is true ≡ blood is red 
 
These seem to be necessarily true semantic axioms and instances of them. Yet, Church claims, their 
proper translations are contingent, empirical truths like: 
 
(3) 'Red' heisst rot. 
                                                 
1 Cf. 1951, 'Carnap's Analysis of Statements of Assertion and Belief,' Analysis 10: 97-99; 1951, 'The Need for 
Abstract Entities in Semantic Analysis' in 1964, Jerry A. Fodor and Jerrold J. Katz, eds., The Structure of 
Language, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall; 1955, 'Putnam on Synonymity and Belief', Analysis 15: 117-
20; 1956, Introduction to Mathematical Logic, Princeton: Princeton UP: 61-62. For a contentious review of the 
literature see Nathan Salmon, 2002, "The Very Possibility of Language" in M. Zeleny and C. A. Anderson, eds., 
Logic, Meaning and Computation, Synthese Library. 
2 In the standard notation of formal logic, '≡' means if and only if 
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(4) 'Blood is red' ist wahr ≡ Blut ist rot. 
 
The truth of (3) and (4) are happenstances of linguistic history. The apparent necessity lost transla-
ting (1)/(2) as (3)/(4) reappears in the modal equivalents of (1)/(2) in German: 
 
(5) 'Rot' heisst rot 
(6) 'Blut ist rot' ist wahr ≡ Blut ist rot. 
 
The trouble is: that translation loses informational equivalence. The German sentences (5)/(6) refer 
to a German word or sentence, not the English ones that (1), (2), (3) and (4) refer to, so they state 
different, independent set of facts. 
 
Church's translation test has impressed many philosophers, logicians and semantic theorists partly 
because it seems to provide a clear and decisive refutation of nominalist and physicalist analyses of 
speech as nothing more than the utterance of sentences, and analyses of thought as nothing more than 
a disposition to utter sentences.3 Those who object to such reductionist analyses for independent rea-
sons see Church's test as confirming common sense and being confirmed by it. Friends of such anal-
yses think otherwise. 
 
So too for the test's implications for basic semantic principles. It may seem a reductio ad absurdum 
of Church's test that it entails that sentences such as (1)/(M) are merely contingent empirical facts of 
language just like: 
 
(7) 'Rot' means red 
(8) 'L' means K. 
 
While (7) and many other form (8) sentences are true, many more form (8) sentences are false, 
whereas on their normal, standard, default reading, every form (M) ('K' means K) sentence states a 
truth. (M) seems much like a principle of logic such as: 
 
(9) K is K 
 
for its instances are all true whatever expression is the 'K'4. Nonetheless, Church took the test's start-
ling entailments as evidence of its utility in exposing common sense assumptions. Church can con-
cede that translating (1) as (5) may be common and contextually appropriate, but still insist that this 
is always due only to speech pragmatics. In its formal semantics, the translation fails for changing 
the subject: (1) and (5) state independent facts by predicating the same semantic property of distinct 
objects5. 
 
Common sense is affronted by Church's conclusion as it is by Zeno's conclusion that motion is im-
possible and all appearances of motion are illusory. Good sense says something must be wrong since 
                                                 
3 Church's primary targets were the analyses proposed by Rudolph Carnap that asserted equivalences some-
thing like: 
(i) Columbus said that the earth is round ≡ 
   Columbus uttered the sentence 'The Earth is round' or some translation of it 
(ii) Columbus believed that the earth is round ≡ 
   Columbus was disposed to utter and assent to the sentence 'The Earth is round' 
   or some translation of it. 
4 Every grammatical sentence of form 9 is true if it is grammatical and meaningful, which requires 'K' to be 
some kind of term. Sentences of form 7 are true whatever meaningful expression is the 'K'. 
5 That 'rot' and 'red' have shared histories is irrelevant here. English might have had 'ret' instead. 
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Church's essays (and this one) are not translatable by his principles: his own translations of his ex-
amples of alleged semantic axioms would lack the appearance of semantic axioms. To restate his 
premises and conclusions, his principles must be flouted. That loss is no mere pragmatic matter. 
Such difficulties, however, don't explain how Church goes wrong. Zeno's arguments are refuted, not 
by wiggling your finger, but by dissolving his puzzle with a refined conception of a continuum – a 
neat feat that took near 2500 years to pull off. Like Zeno, Church challenges us to rethink our rep-
resentations of meanings and truths, and thereby refine our conception of meaning and truth. 
 
We should wonder: How could translation seem to have real utility as a test of necessary truths? How 
could the contingency of a truth be evident and uncontroversial when expressed in one language yet 
be obscured and seem to be a necessity when stated in another language? Presumably, any feature 
apparent only under translation, not in the original, should be a discrepancy in and of the translation6. 
 
The puzzle is missed if the situation is mistaken for one of the many cases where a sentence has no 
accurate translation in some other language. Crucially, Church's test applies only when and because 
the original and translation sentences state the same fact: the same properties are predicated of the 
same objects. Also crucial: Church's argument doesn't rely on any peculiarity of one or a few lan-
guages. His argument works with any two languages, and is just as valid and almost as vivid with 
intra-language translations (synonymies) as with inter-language translations. Church's translation 
paradox is as language-neutral as Zeno's. It concerns a sentential element available in every natural 
language by which the language can freely talk about itself. The paradox is generated by what 
Church and others influenced by Gottlob Frege call quotations. 
 
2. Quotations vs. displays 
The Fregean tradition adapts the term 'quotation' to mean "a device used to refer to typographical or 
phonetic shapes by exhibiting samples, that is, inscriptions or utterances that have those shapes.”7 
This terminology is unfortunate. In its common colloquial sense, we quote only something someone 
has said. Quoting is an action performed by a speaker (or utterance or sentence) only by repeating 
verbal content of a prior utterance. The original may be spoken or written, actual or fictional, re-
peated verbatim or not, in the same or language or another, by the speaker or another, but the original 
speech act must be describable in indirect discourse and in other languages. 
 
Post-Fregean theorists call any sentence-embedded display of material, like (1) or: 
 
(10) Fred's Fiat went 'kehfloo' 
 
a quotation. Better to call them displays. Being a quotation is an historical property, not a semantic or 
syntactic one. Displays are semantically and syntactically distinctive sentential elements without es-
sential historical relations. 
 
Many displays are, like (1) and (10), not quotations. Many quotations are not displayed. Direct dis-
course is the display of an actual quotation or a possible one, something sayable. There the words are 
referred to and something is predicated of them, if only that the words were (not) or might (not) be 
said. Quoting by displaying is common. So too is quoting without displaying. Quoting is repeating 
speech, not necessarily referring to or displaying speech. We (especially the educated) often echo 
                                                 
6 This is implicit in the inspiration for Church's Test, C. H. Langford's idea of using translation as "a simple 
test which helps us to determine whether a word is being used or talked about" (1937, Journal of Symbolic 
Logic 2 : 53.) Langford's "test" looks backwards since determining whether the word is being used or talked 
about may be a precondition of proper translation. 
7 Donald Davidson, 1984, “Quotation”, in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
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quote: we use the words of others (who could be ourselves earlier) to say what the words say, and 
thus to say much the same as the original speaker said with the words. Consider:  
 
(11) Cosmological arguments involve "an unnecessary shuffle". 
 
I there quote Wittgenstein, and would without the marks. The marks say only this was said before. 
The marks don't create the historical fact; the punctuational message is true, delivered or not. The 
marks report only that there is some such historical fact; they don't refer to Wittgenstein or identify 
any speaker. This punctuational message is outside the semantic content of (11), which says nothing 
about words. The sense and truth of (11) are independent of the punctuation and the truth of its mes-
sage. Contrast: 
 
(12) Cosmological arguments involve what Wittgenstein might call "an unnecessary 
shuffle". 
 
Here the marks acquire an additional message: this is displayed. They signal that the material is re-
ferred to by the inserted term, "what Wittgenstein might call". (12) refers to the displayed phrase-
type and attributes an historical feature to it. That attribution of prior utterance enters (12)'s truth 
conditions. 
 
Unlike displays, quotations are distinguished, not by their linguistic properties, but by their historical 
relations. For being a quotation, what centrally matters is whether the choice of words is explained 
partly by the original utterance. Coincidental duplications are not quotations. To ask, 'What is truth?', 
is not, ipso facto, to plagiarize Pilate. Quoting requires some explanatory linkage from quotee to quo-
ter. That linkage needn't involve the quoters knowledge of it. People commonly use sayings unaware 
of their having an author. We ask them, "Did you know that that's a quotation from Mencken?" or "Did 
you know that you were quoting Mencken?". To properly reply, “He may have said it first, but I wasn't 
quoting him”, you may need some reason to suppose that Mencken’s utterance had nothing to do with 
your using those very words. 
 
Intentionality of repetition is neither essential nor enough. Reciting is not quoting. We may quote lyr-
ics, but not while singing the song, not even if the lyrics or lines are quotes. I quote Mencken, not 
Veblen, when I quote Mencken quoting Veblen. We may quote lines from a play, pledge or prayer, 
but not while play acting, pledging or praying. A supplicant fervently reciting the Lord’s Prayer does 
not quote it, as she would by echoing its lines amidst prayers or essays she authors. 
 
The common concept of quotation has considerable complexity. Its contours don't answer to any 
formal linguistic theory; they reflect the complexity and variety of language users' interests in what 
was said by whom – in all the various senses of the ambiguous term, "what was said". Assigning res-
ponsibility for words used has various kinds of importance. Consider the great range of reasons for 
saying: Don’t quote me on this. This is a distinct, derivative sense of "quote": to attribute words to 
someone. Both senses normally apply to direct discourse quoting, whereas only the primary sense 
normally applies to echo quoting. 
 
The accuracy and adequacy speech replication depends partly on semantic, syntactic and phonetic/ 
graphemic features of the original, but ultimately the ruling considerations are pragmatic, driven by 
the contextually variable interests of the quoter and audience in the replication of speech. Often we 
require quotations to be verbatim, but writing is quotable in speech and speech in writing. Sometimes 
written quotations need to replicate fonts and spoken quotations must imitate the intonation contours, 
loudness and the like. Sometimes accurate replication includes extra-sentential perceptual features, 
like stuttering and gestures. On the other hand, inter-linguistic translation of a quotation often counts 
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as a quotation. There only the semantic content is replicated, not physical features. There are limits to 
this. We do not quote in saying: 
 
(13) He went on for hours, "blah, blah, blah". 
 
Since quotation translation is so context dependent on the interests of speaker and audience, a canon 
for quotation translation can have few distinctive general principles beyond those of translation gen-
erally. 
 
3. Displays vs. autonomes 
Formal theorists have little interest in quotations, but lots of interest in the so-called quotation marks 
used to mark displays – punctuation best called display marks. Theoretical interest in displays and 
displays marks comes from Frege and the new formal disciplines of metalinguistics and metamath-
ematics. Key to the new formal languages is an effective mechanical procedure that forms singular 
terms which designate any expression we can create and algorithmically identifies its designatum. The 
obvious choice is to make enquotation a lexical engine yielding a singular term referring to the (kind 
of) expression enquoted and identifying that referent by exemplifying it. These formalist enquota-
tions differ semantically and syntactically from natural language displays, so to avoid equivocation 
we'll call these formalist enquotations autonomes, and form them by flanking stars, thusly: 
 
(1*) *Red* means red. 
 
We'll say an autonome of an expression (type) is formed by enstarring (an instance of) it. 
 
Formal theorists have thought they were providing analyses of displays, but their original and prim-
ary focus has been on a device fit for formal theories. Like pre-Fregeans, they generally had no inde-
pendent interest in natural language display grammar. Initially formal theorists thought that enquota-
tion (i.e., enstarring) generates an endless set of names (or singular descriptions), one for each lexical 
item in a language, and each of the endless combinations thereof. That may be a serviceable concept-
tion of autonomes. It can seem to fit displays, until the idea is thought through. 
 
4. Display marks 
The deepest objection motivates the later analysis of displays as demonstratives, which observes that 
an assertion with a sentence-embedded display is functionally fundamentally equivalent to an utter-
ance of the same sentence with its display exported and the speaker drawing the audience's attention 
to a speech-external replica8. The semantics of speech acts so appropriating speech-external objects 
is explained without regarding those objects as names or terms or words, except when they happen to 
be so independent of their appropriation. Nothing about their importation into a sentence requires 
their acquiring the character of words. Demonstrative theories rightly aspire to explain this semantic 
equivalence. Competing analyses have lacked that laudable aspiration. They predicate of displays se-
mantic and syntactic properties inapplicable to speech-external replicas, like termhood, and leave the 
discrepancy unexplained. 
 
Demonstrative theorists conclude that enquoting adds only one term: the marks are a demonstrative 
indexically pointing through the exemplifying expression to the expression-type exemplified, like a 
finger pointing at a speech-external object. This too may be a plausible account of autonomes but not 
of displays. 
                                                 
8 Cf. Donald Davidson, 1984. See also, Ernie Lepore and Herman Cappelen, 1997, “Varieties of Quotation”, 
Mind, 106: 429-50. Niels Christensen anticipated Davidson (1967, "The Alleged Distinction between Use and 
Mention", Philosophical Review, 76, pp. 358-67), but has not been nearly as influential. 
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This demonstrative thesis entails the absurdity that, despite all evidence to the contrary, no one ever 
properly used or understood displays until they used and understood display marks – a punctuation 
unused, unknown, uninvented until rather recently. Even today display marking is almost exclusively 
reserved for written displays and there the usage is erratic outside formal writing. (Note that if dis-
plays were names, display markings could be semantically empty disambiguators. Formal theorists 
don't so regard them because they require their formal languages to be unambiguous, with each sym-
bol having only one sense assigned it, so an unenstarred symbol can there have only one inter-
pretation. Enstarring creates a new symbol referring to the enstarred symbol-type, so autonome stars 
are morphemic). 
 
The demonstrative thesis is that (14) and (15) are equivalent: 
 
(14) He said to me, "Go home!" 
(15) Go home! That's what he said to me. 
 
This flouts standard display punctuation conventions, for they apply much the same to all speech-em-
bedded objects, sentenced-embedded or not. Style books all say the proper equivalent of (14) is not 
(15), but instead 
 
(16) "Go home!" That's what he said to me. 
 
Demonstrative theories can have no account of the display and punctuation of (16) – they prohibit 
them! – and thus no real account of their semantically equivalent replicas in (14). 
 
The source of confusion is readily spotted. Davidson analyzes (17) as (18): 
 
(17) 'Alice swooned' is a sentence 
(18) Alice swooned. The expression of which this is a token is a sentence. 
 
That should entail analyzing (19) as the nonsensical (20): 
 
(19) The expression, 'Alice swooned', is a sentence 
(20) Alice swooned. The expression, the expression of which this is a token, is a 
sentence. 
 
The fault in this and every display analysis in the Fregean tradition is a failure to notice that displays 
and their external replicas always operate as adjuncts to some explicit or implicit term like "the ex-
pression", what I will call a displasionable term . That failure comes from over-focus on formal lan-
guages. 
 
5. Displasionable terms 
The displays formalists focus on formalizing are all, like (1) and (17), sentence-embedded expres-
sions adjunctive to a singular term that refers to the expression-type the display exemplifies. Elision 
of the displasionable term in such sentences is common in natural languages since the implicit term 
is often obvious from the context. Formal systems impose a fixed reading of the kind of thing to which 
an autonome refers, so explicit displasionable terms are superfluous there – except that well-formed 
formula there are supposed to be fully explicit. Understandably, formal theorists haven't notice that 
in natural languages displays very commonly do appear appositional to a displasionable term, and 
that the term always can appear without altering the utterance's sense. 
 
And, since formal theories don't support linguistic appropriation of speech-external objects, theorists 
also haven't noticed that when linguistically appropriating a speech-external object, the utterance is 
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not a grammatically complete sentence unless the displasionable term is explicit. If, instead of sen-
tence (10) you say 
 
(10x) Frank's Fiat went  
 
while producing or pointing at a contemporaneous sound, "kehfloo", you do make a compete state-
ment, but the words uttered don't constitute a grammatically complete sentence (unless the irrelevant 
intransitive sense of "went" is used.) To make your statement with a complete sentence you must say 
something like 
 
(10xe) Frank's Fiat made the sound 
 
while directing your audience's attention to a sound, "kehfloo". 
 
Displays are adjuncts of what I'll call ostensionable terms, and more specifically of display osten-
sionable terms. A term is ostensionable if its intended extension is identifiable by ostending or direc-
ting attention at a particular concrete object: e.g., words like: pentagon, pentagonal, Pluto, loud, 
sweet, she, here. Terms like pedigree, purpose, pulchritude, invisible are not so ostensionable. Some 
terms, like solar system become ostensionable when we create ostendable concrete images or objects 
representing the thing. A term is display-ostensionable – for short, displasionable – if its intended 
extension is identifiable by ostending or directing attention at an object physically incorporable in an 
utterance. Terms referring to linguistic expressions are paradigmatically displasionable. Any lin-
guistic expression-token is ipso facto an utterance incorporable object, and its replicas, type, and 
meaning are possible referents identifiable by displaying the token in writing or speech. Much that 
we point at to identify an extension is not readily replicable in a form incorporable into an utterance; 
words like she, here, soft, sweet, tickle, blood, marathon are ostensionable but not displasionable. 
Words liked red and pentagon are displasionable in writing, not speech, whereas c-sharp is a dis-
plasionable term in speech but not writing. Ostensionablity and displasionablity are matters of de-
gree, depending on factors like observability, existing conventions, and the speaker's ingenuity. 'Ve-
nus' (the planet-name) is more ostensionable than 'Pluto' since its referent is more visible in the night 
sky. They are equally ostensionable with astronomical diagrams. Neither term is readily dis-
plasionable, but becomes so by highlighting the second or ninth planet of a sentence-embedded solar 
system schematic. 
 
Display marks say simply: this material is displayed. Like italics on foreign expressions, their func-
tion is solely epistemic, not semantic. They only disambiguate, and could not do that unless the un-
marked expression were already readable as a display. We could never have learned to use display 
marks – or have imagined there was something to mark – before we already used and understood 
unmarked displays. Arguably, we could never acquire a first language if we could not use unmarked 
displays, for arguably we could not acquire a first language if sentences like "This is red" were not 
naturally readable both objectually (This has the property of being red) and metalinguistically (This 
property is called "red".) We must learn how to call things by their (proper or common) names be-
fore we can understand explicit metalinguistic expressions like: This is called 'red'. 
 
The marks only enforce a reading the expression already has. They don't preclude also reading the 
marked expressions per usual, as with the expression "an unnecessary shuffle" in (12). They are gen-
erally unnecessary outside metalevel talk because disambiguation is effected by commas or sentence 
content or speech context, which renders a display reading available or not, likely or not. Apposi-
tional to an explicit displasionable term, displays can rarely fail to be read as such. 
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6. Reference & representation 
All displays have the same abstract generic function, which has two species. Most displays are rep-
resentational, but the most basic semantic role is as referent, the entire extension of the displasion-
able term, as in: 
 
(21) This pentagon, £, is black. 
 
Call this a referent display. The reference is ambiguous. The intended referent may be the unique 
physical object displayed, so any reproduction of the sentence expresses another statement about an-
other referent object. (Exceptions to this are possible, for example, by composing sentences on a 
magnet board and moving the display-magnet from one sentence-frame to a replica.) On another 
reading, the referent is fixed self-referentially as the type of object adjunctive to the displasionable 
term, so reproductions of the sentence all make the statement about the same referent object. This 
introduces an endless ambiguity because the referent is determined by the criteria for accurate replic-
ation of the display, and those criteria are open-ended, limited only by the two general terms pen-
tagon/black. What we count as a (satisfactory) replica of the display is constrained only by the pur-
poses and perceptual propensities of the speaker and audience. 
 
We have no end of occasions to refer to concrete objects existing independent of reference to them. 
We rarely have reason to utter a sentence referring to a concrete constituent of our utterance, so ref-
erent displays are rarely used. They are important for linguistic theory because any utterance em-
bedding a representational display can be recast as an equivalent utterance embedding a referent dis-
play. 
 
The relation of the displasionable term to its referent display is the basic semantic dyad of a singular 
term to its referent object. A representative display is in a triadic relation with its displasionable term 
and that term's intended extension, something other than the display aiding its identification. Rep-
resentative displays may operate with both referential singular terms and with what Fregean quan-
tificational logic calls predicates, terms that may be predicable or true of many objects but don't des-
ignate any object. Consider: 
 
(22) An engine sound, 'kehfloo', is an indicator of bad valves. 
(23) No (letter) 'i' went undotted, but some (letter) 't''s weren't crossed 
 
The displays identify the extensions of the displasionable terms (engine sound, letter) by exemplify-
ying those extensions, not by being the extension or referring to it. The displasionable term predict-
ates a property and does not refer to it, or to its display or anything else.  
 
With a singular, referential displasionable term, the display may aid identification of the intended ex-
tension by one of three relationships. In 
 
(10C) The Fiat's noise 'kehfloo' startled the cat. 
 
the referent is a concrete particular sound (a vocalization of) the display replicates. In (1) ('Red' 
means red) the referent may be the word-type the display instances (exemplifies.) Thirdly, in 
 
(24) The proposition, 'Blood is red' is true 
 
the display expresses the intended proposition and does not replicate or instantiate that trans-nota-
tional object: the relation is conventional, not natural, perceptual. 
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Representative displays are reformulable as referent displays. Demonstrative theories derive their 
plausibility from the equivalence of: 
 
(1e) The word 'flea' means puce 
1R) (The word exemplified by this, ‘flea’, means puce. 
 
More generally, the sentence schema, The T, ‘…’, is F, is ambiguous. The display could be replicat-
ive (The T replicated by this, ‘…’, is F), instantiative (The T exemplified by this, ‘…’, is F), expres-
sive (The T expressed by this, ‘…’, is F) or it could be the referent (The T that is this, ‘…’, is F). The 
basic form of predicative displays, x is a T, ‘…’, is equivalent to the referent display: x is a T exem-
plified by this, ‘…’. Triadic representative display sentences are equivalent to dyadic referent dis-
plays sentences, which are equivalent to display-exported sentences uttered with direct ostension of 
the term's referent. Evidently, displays needn't (be thought to) refer to anything. The equivalences 
tell us that the representational role of displays is not referential. 
 
7. Display syntax 
Despite their fundamental functional similarities, a display differs grammatically from a linguistical-
ly appropriated external counterpart. An external counterpart is linguistically appropriated by refer-
ring to it by some extrasentential referential supplement like finger pointing. A speaker activity like 
finger pointing may be unnecessary since other sentence-external contextual factors may entitle the 
speaker to expect his audience to direct its attention to the intended object to identify the ostension-
able term's extension. Still, the object's utterance-independence entails that its linguistic appropria-
tion requires some speaker's reference to it. That requirement disappears with sentence-embedding. 
 
Displays are linguistically appropriated by their positioning within a syntactic structure. The location 
of appropriated extrasentential objects is limited only by pragmatics, not syntax. Generally displays 
must adjoin their displasionable term or else the sentence is gibberish. In English, a display standard-
ly succeeds its term, but representational displays often can precede their displasionable term: 
 
(10^) Fred's Fiat made the ‘kehfloo’ sound 
(23^) No ‘i’ letter went undotted, but some ‘t’ letters went uncrossed 
(24^) The ‘Blood is red’ proposition is true. 
 
Referent displays are referents of their displasionable term. Representational displays are, like other 
sentential elements, not referred to by anything in the utterance. (Display marks refer to the display 
marked in the sense that italics refer to the foreign expression italicized; such punctuational "referen-
ces" are stage setting, not semantic constituents; they don't contribute to a sentence's semantic content). 
 
A display is a bona fide syntactic constituent. It can be a pivotal element in formal truths, sentences 
that express truths due solely to their logico-syntactic structure and independent of the meanings of 
their terms. Consider: 
 
(25) Fred's Fiat made the sound ‘kehfloo’ ≡ 
Fred's Fiat made the sound 'kehfloo' 
(26) Fred's Fiat made the sound ‘kehfloo’ ≡ 
Frank's Fiat made the sound (+ gesturing at an external ‘kehfloo’ sound). 
 
Unlike (25), (26) is not a logical truth; its antecedent differs formally from its consequent. Its form is: 
p ≡ q, not p ≡ p. 
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8. Formal truths 
The peculiarities of display grammar are inessential to (25)'s logical form; suffice that the display re-
occurs. Their distinctive grammar is essential to expressions of semantic axioms like: 
 
(7) 'K' means K 
(27) 'K' means L ≡ 'L' means K 
(28) 'p' is true ≡ p ≡ that p is true ≡ that p is a fact 
 
This is key to dissolving Church's translation paradox. 
The translation paradox is a special case of the synonymity antinomy I have discussed elsewhere9. 
Church's underlying translation principle is an instance of the basic Synonym Substitution Principle: 
 
SSP: synonym substitution preserves sentence sense. 
 
SSP implies that: 
 
'K' means L ≡ 'K' means K means 'K' means L. 
 
SSP fails for formal, logical truths. A sentence true due to its logical syntax like: 
 
(29) A television is a television 
 
is not synonymous with a synomic interception like: 
 
(30) A television is a TV. 
 
An interception is the process or product of nonuniform substitution of a term pivotal to a truth-secu-
ring syntax. Intercepting eliminates the expression-recurrence essential to the sentence's truth-secu-
ring syntax, and thereby eliminates its logical necessity. Intercepting an objectual logical truth, (29), 
with a synonym replaces the logico-syntactic necessity with a lexical necessity explained by the ex-
tra-syntactic, contingent synonymy of distinct terms. While (29)/(30) have the same factual content 
(same properties predicated of same objects), they don't sound synonymous and are not used in-
terchangeably for they differ in meaning. Their truths have different kinds of explanations. Church 
and other Fregeans don't recognize this failure of SSP with formal truths. 
 
Semantic axioms expressed with displays are a special case of failure of SSP. Here synomic inter-
cepting transforms a necessity like: 
 
(31) 'A television' means a television 
 
into a contingency like: 
 
(32) 'A television' means a TV 
 
- a contingency that explains the lexical necessity of (30), a nonuniform synonym substitution in an 
objectual formal truth, (29). The failure of SSP with (31) is explained by and is evidence for (31) 
being a formal truth, true solely by its logico-syntactic form. 
 
                                                 
9 1998, "The Synonymy Antinomy" in A. Kanamori, ed., Proceedings of the 20th World Congress of Philos-
ophy, Vol VI: Analytic Philosophy & Logic, Philosophy Document Center, 1-21 
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Church's explanation of the contingency of (1)/(31)/(32) implicitly recognizes that displays subserve 
displasionable terms. He sees that the extension identified by a display could be all kinds of things 
depending on the displasionable term, so the truth conditions and truth value of the statement ex-
pressed depend on the intended displasionable term. Church assumes that the displasionable term in 
(1) and (31)/(32) is the English word, and he rightly infers that the statements can then be only con-
tingently true, for he rightly assumes that the extension of any such displasionable term is fixed by 
extrasyntactic contingencies. 
 
9. Form & reference 
Church's reading of (1)/(31) is appropriate for autonomes; for displays it is grammatically possible, 
but unnatural, not standard. The normal, default reading takes it that the expression serving as the 
grammatical object of "means" replicates the display, and as such the statement is and must be true 
whatever be the specific expression. We read (1)/(31) as objectually empty formal truths by naturally 
and properly assuming that the display is identified intra-sententially, self-referentially. Our tacit 
displasionable term is something like: the expression in the language of this utterance. That term 
must itself be translated into whatever language is being spoken. With that displasionable term (1) is 
rightly translated as (5) ('Rot' heisst rot), not (3) ('Red' heisst rot). 
 
That is the default displasionable term for displayed expressions. A child can understand (1)/(31)/ 
(32) without any conception of words belonging to one language but not another, and thus without 
anything like Church's conception English: i.e., a language independent of what the speaker is spea-
king. We cannot but acquire our first language by naturally reading the display in 'K' means L as be-
ing in the language being spoken. We always safely assume that we are currently speaking whatever 
language we are currently speaking; whether we are currently speaking English is an empirical hy-
pothesis. 
 
This reading of displayed expressions is not stipulated or conventional or akin to assigning an inter-
pretation to a formal language. The reading operates on much the same principle as reading both oc-
currences of the grapheme 'a television' in (29)(A television is a television) as tokens of the same 
symbol, having the same meaning. (29)/(1)/(31) are true due solely to their formal structure; ex-
pression recurrence is not an extra-formal means of securing sameness of symbol sense. 
 
(1)/(31) are true whatever the meaning of the expressions displayed, for they are true whatever be the 
expressions displayed, so long as they replicate the expressions meant. Terms in formal truths do not 
lose or alter their normal objectual reference, but that reference becomes idle, subordinate to the truth 
of what is said. The only feature of the referent of (31) determining the truth of what (31) says is that 
the referent's display in (31) replicates the expression meant . The references in (1)/(31) are not per 
se to English words but to whatever expressions replicate the expressions there meant. Those refer-
ents aren't identifiable prior to the truth of the statements. 
 
(M) ('K' means K) is an identity axiom, a semantic identity comparable to the objectual identity 
axiom: 
 
(I) K=K. 
 
(M) has the transform: 
 
(MI) The meaning of (the expression) 'K' = K. 
 
'K' is used objectually (referentially or predicationally) in both its occurrences in (I), but not in either 
occurrence in (M)/(MI). The left term of (MI), The meaning of (the expression) 'K', identifies and 
refers to an expression's meaning. It does so by referring to and identifying the expression, by na-
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ming its genus and displaying an individual exemplifying the species. The displayed expression isn't 
semantically a term; it doesn't designate or predicate. 
 
The right term of (M)/(MI) is also not semantically a term. Its syntactic position calls for a term, yet 
any linguistic expression, whatever its syntax elsewhere, can have this right hand occurrence just as 
it can have the left hand occurrence. In both occurrences the expression serves to identify the referent 
meaning, but not by referring to or describing the expression or its meaning, but by having and ex-
pressing that meaning. 
Like Frege's puzzle about objectual identities, Church's paradox about semantic identities is born of a 
failure to appreciate the significance of expression recurrence for logical form, a failure born of con-
ceiving of logical form as a property of trans-linguistic thoughts (propositions) rather than the rep-
resentational structures of sentences10. 
 
                                                 
10 My thanks to Bredo Johnsen for, per usual, saving me from various mistakes. 
